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MULTIPLE CAUSES AND
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
By WILLIAM E. DOYLE*
judge Doyle discusses and analyzes the problems arising when
several persons' individual conduct, which is neither concerted nor
coincidental in time, causes indivisible harm to another. The courts'
refusal to hold the defendants jointly responsible is considered to be
unsatisfactory, and the American Law Institute's proposed solution
is considered in some detail. judge Doyle approvingly discusses the
ALI's apportionment of liability by shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant and concludes that "experience has shown that the
probabilities favor a just result where joint liability is imposed."
"Ignorance of history sometimes builds up a rule of thumb,
which when applied by mere logic, does cruel wrong."'
N THE above statement Professor Wigmore was referring to
that rule of law which held defendants liable jointly who acted
contemporaneously or in concert to produce an indivisible harm. He
went on to point out that in such circumstances the law wisely held
each of the wrongdoers liable for the entire harm inflicted. But as
"joint" is interpreted to mean concert of action, the case of the
indivisible harm resulting from conduct of several persons which
do not coincide time-wise or which is not concerted was, anomalously,
outside the rule. Wigmore insisted that the reason for joint liability
existed and had existed historically regardless of whether there was
true concert of action. His prime example of "cruel wrong" was
the case of Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co.,2 wherein six coal
mining companies ruined the plaintiff's farm by contributing to the
pollution of a stream which ran adjacent to the farm. The West
Virginia court refused to hold the defendants jointly responsible.
Both before and after the Wigmore note there has been wide-
spread concern about the seemingly simple but actually complex
problem of concurrent factual causes and joint liability, particularly
when it arose in the Farley type of pollution cases. Little has been
done to remedy the difficulty, however. The present discussion
considers the recent valiant effort by the American Law Institute to
prescribe a fair approach and solution to such non-concert of action
*U.S. Dist. Ct. Judge; member, American, Colorado and Denver Bar; L.L.B., George
Washington Univ., 1937; Justice, Colo. Sup. Ct., 1959-61; part-time instructor, Univ.
of Denver College of Law. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey L. Brown, a senior at
the University of Denver College of Law for his research assistance
1 Wigmore, Jointfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent Party Suffer
Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458 (1923).
2 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
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cases. Two companion sections' have been added in its new publi-
cation, The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second. These sec-
tions are called to the attention of the bar primarily in respect to
the pollution problem because this is the extreme and exaggerated
application of the old rule. These sections also apply, however,
to every kind of case in which several persons contribute to an
injury. The guidelines there outlined are applicable regardless of
whether the causes are concurrent in time or whether there is concert
of action in the real sense.
The typical difficult case is that of the riparian farmer or
rancher whose land or cattle suffer injury from upstream pollution
resulting from independent acts on the part of several industries.
Must he pursue each of the alleged violators individually? If he has
suffered a single cumulative injury he faces difficult and sometimes
impossible problems of proof. Ordinarily the injury is, as a practical
matter, indivisible in that the contribution of any single one of the
miscreants can not readily be identified and isolated. The damage
problem is similarly complex. Indeed, it may result that no single
one of the offenders has been a substantial factor in the production
of the harm suffered. It is likely that the plaintiff will be unable
to generate proof, even in terms of rough percentages, of the extent
of each defendant's contribution. Thus, after expensive discovery
and litigation, the hapless farmer may well discover that he has no
cognizable claim. These complexities and difficulties have often
led lawyers and litigants to abandon the action at the outset. The
result is that the downstream owner is placed in the position of
bearing the cost of acts of pollution for which he is not in the least
responsible. The injustice of this result has been noted from time
tc time in the literature.'
This particular cause problem is described by Prosser5 as one
of apportionment of damages. The basic assumption is that the
defendant's conduct has been the cause of some damage suffered
by the plaintiff. Prosser further states that it is not primarily a
question of causation but rather one of the feasibility and con-
venience of splitting up the total harm into separate parts attribu-
table to two or more causes. The learned author concludes that
where there is some feasible basis for an apportionment it should
be made but if not, the practical course is to hold the defendant
liable for the entire loss.
To describe this problem as merely a question of apportion-
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS 433A-B '(1965).
4Jackson, joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 399 (1939); Prosser,
joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937) ; Wigmore, supra
note 1.
5
PROSSER, TORTS 247 (3d ed. 1964).
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ment of damages seems at first to be oversimplification. Courts
typically consider it a problem of adequacy of evidence to prove
injury and to establish a factual link in the chain of causation, and
frequently tend to ask whether the causes are concurrent, concerted
or independent. Courts also on occasion stumble over a procedural
obstacle, that of misjoinder. The Restatement sections eliminate
most of these questions and follow the Prosser analysis.
Considering the complexity often involved, it is not surprising
that the trend of decisions has been to refuse to hold a defendant
liable on a joint basis where the plaintiff has been unable to show
the extent of the individual defendant's impact. Thus, where the
plaintiff has not been able to adduce proof of ,the amount of damages
attributable to each defendant he has lost his case.
I. RESTATEMENT VIEWPOINT
The injustice of this result led the American Law Institute to
adopt companion sections 433A and 433B.'
Section 433A concerns itself with the case in which the injuries
are distinct and the damages can be apportioned. It provides:
§433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or
more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned
among two or more causes.7
Comment a to this section emphasizes that it applies whenever
two or more causes have combined to bring about harm to the plain-
tiff and each has been a substantial factor in producing the harm.
Undoubtedly, the section contemplates that the conduct of each
participant has an independent origin, for it notes that it is im-
material whether or not all of the participants are joined. The
section has in mind successive injuries, distinct harms, divisible
harm, and innocent causes associated with tortious ones.
The comment on subsection (2) calls attention to the fact that
certain harms are by their nature incapable of any logical, reasonable,
or practical division. "Death is that kind of harm, since it is im-
possible, except upon a purely arbitrary basis for the purpose of
accomplishing the result, to say that one man has caused half of
it and another the rest."' This comment continues:
Where two or more causes combine to produce such a single result,
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS (1965).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 433A (1965).
8 Id. § 433A, comment i at 439.
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incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts have re-
fused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each
of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm. The
typical case is that of two negligently driven vehicles which collide
and kill a bystander. The two drivers have not acted in concert, and
the duties which they owe are separate and distinct, and may not be
identical in character or scope; but the entire liability of each rests
upon the obvious fact that each has caused the single result, and
that no rational basis for division can be found.9
Thus there is a recognition of the view accepted by the cases where
a combination of causes produces harm. The comment points out
that the section is not limited to simultaneous causes - that it also
applies where one defendant has produced a condition and a subse-
quent defendant acts later to cause the harm.
The device which has been adopted to solve the problem under
consideration, that is, apportionment of cause and damage in the
multiple cause case, is ingenious. It uses a method which has become
increasingly popular- the shifting of the burden of proof. Section
433B, here the center of interest, recognizes that in the ordinary
case "the burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the defendant
has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff."'" It goes
on to point out the exceptional cases in subsections (2) and (3).
Subsection (2) provides:
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has com-
bined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the
actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is cap-
able of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the
apportionment is upon each such actor.'
A similar technique is prescribed in subsection (3) for solving
the case of two or more persons who acted and the conduct of only
one has caused the harm to the plaintiff but it is not possible to
ascertain with certainty which one is responsible. Like subsection (2)
it declares that "the burden is upon each such actor to prove that
he has not caused the harm."' 2 The familiar example of this is the
case in which two hunters shoot at the same time in the direction
of the plaintiff who is struck by a single shot which could have
come from either gun. The shooters can be sued jointly and in the
action each has the burden of proving that the shot did not come
from his gun. If he fails to do so he is subject to liability. Conceiv-
ably, both defendants could fail to bring forward necessary proof;
this would render both of them liable. 3
9 Id. at 440.
'ld. § 433B(1), at 441.
11 Ibid.
12 Id. at 442.
13 Reyher v. Mayne, 90 Colo. 586, 10 P.2d 1109 (1932).
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It is subsection (2) which introduces the new and revolutionary
approach which is most interesting. According to the comment it
applies where there are distinct independent harms capable of ap-
portionment. It contemplates, however, the ultimate presentation of
evidence -to establish the extent of the contribution of each. In such
a case the obscurity must be cleared away by the defendant, the party
who is in the best position to know the extent of his impact. The
rationale of the subsection is succinctly set forth in -the comment:
d. The reason for the exceptional rule placing the burden of
proof as to apportionment upon the defendant or defendants is the
injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer who has in fact caused
harm to the plaintiff to escape liability merely because the harm
which he has inflicted has combined with similar harm inflicted by
other wrongdoers, and the nature of the harm itself has made it nec-
essary that evidence be produced before it can be apportioned. In
such a case the defendant may justly be required to assume the bur-
den of producing that evidence, or if he is not able to do so, of
bearing the full responsibility. As between the proved tort feasor
who has clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent plain-
tiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent of the
harm caused should fall upon the former.
14
II. PRIOR CASE HISTORY
The somewhat drastic nature of the proposed change is ap-
parent from a study of some of the early cases which expound the
rule of nonliability. A good example of this orthodox majority rule
is Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co."5 Farley overruled an earlier de-
cision of the West Virginia court, that of Day v. Louisville Coal &
Coke Co. 6 Day had held several stream polluters jointly and sever-
ally liable on the simple basis that there was direct causation. In
Farley the action was against six coal mining corporations located
along tributaries of the Bluestone River. Plaintiff complained that
the several companies had caused damage to his farm. Although he
recovered in the trial court, this judgment was reversed on appeal,
the court saying: "There is no allegation that the defendants acted
in concert, collusion, or in pursuit of a common design in the per-
formance of the acts which are alleged to have injured and defiled
the stream and damaged plaintiff's land."" The court further held
that the principle of concurrent causation could not be applied in
pollution cases because of the consequential nature of the injury
and, therefore, the remoteness of the result. It said: "The injury
to the plaintiff is consequential only, or remotely resulting, as con-
1
4 
RFs ATMNT (SECON ) ,TORTS at §4,B at 444 (1965).
15 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
1660 W. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (1906).
17 Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 597, 102 S.E. 265, 266 (1920).
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tradistinguished from direct and immediate."' 8 The court did not
fail to recognize the obvious fact that "viewed from a merely prac-
tical standpoint, this distinction may not be important;"' 9 that the
injury is equally serious regardless of whether the impact is direct
or consequential or results from joint, coincident, or contemporan-
eous action of the wrongdoers. Apparently, however, the court felt
it was helpless to grant relief. The underlying basis for the court's
decision is found in the policy statement which declares:
In this state the development of natural resources and location
of mills and factories along its numerous streams has only fairly
commenced; wherefore it is highly important that the rights of ripar-
ian owners and persons conducting diverse kinds of business along
the water courses and their remedies for wrongful acts respecting
them and the adjacent lands be correctly defined.
20
The opinion notes that the overwhelming weight of authorities
stands against the court's former opinion in Day, holding, as it
does, that several defendants may be joined in one action under
circumstances such as those presented in the case and that liability
may be imposed upon one of several individuals for the entire
damage.
Thus, the West Virginia court was concerned with a number
of problems, including the propriety of joinder, concurrent action,
and joint liability in a case in which each of the defendants had
acted independently. The court was also apprehensive about whether
each of the defendants had inflicted a substantial injury on plaintiff
whereby there was a cognizable harm inflicted. Thus Farley is a
classic example of the orthodox viewpoint. Although it unques-
tionably had and continues to have the support of the vast maiority
of decided cases,"' the injustice of the result was recognized even at
the time. 2
Since 1920 a few states have refused to follow the majority
rule and have reached the contrary result by simply concluding
that there was concurrent causation.2 However, one decision stands
out as a fully reasoned opinion and a leading case for the minority
view. It is the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Landers v.
East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. 4 Two separate companies per-
18 Id. at 598, 102 S.E. at 267.
19 Id. at 600, 102 S.E. at 267.
20Id. at 602, 102 S.E. at 268.
2
1 Annot., 91 A.L.R. 759 (1934); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 409 (1925); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 939
(1920).
2 18 MICH. L. REv. 708 (1920) ; 29 YALE L.J. 935 (1920).
2 See McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913) ; Prairie Oil &
Gas Co. v. Laskey, 173 Okla. 48, 46 P.2d 484 (1935) ; Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153
Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931).
24 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
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mitted their pipelines to break at about the same time, resulting in
the escape of salt water and oil into the plaintiff's lake which killed
his fish and polluted the water. The court held the defendants
liable on a joint and several basis, adopting the rule that
"Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce
an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature can-
not be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrong-
doers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable
for the entire damages * * * -25
The court explained the reason for the holding as being the impos-
sibility of plaintiff's satisfying the burden of proving the portion of
injury attributable to each defendant. Several earlier Texas decisions
are cited to illustrate the difficulties which the plaintiff faces in prov-
ing liability. These, of course, were overruled by Landers.
In this 1952 decision, the opinion of the Texas court, by Mr.
Justice Calvert, noted the existence of criticism of the rule refusing
to recognize joint liability where the torts have had independent
origin but have produced a single injury to the land of another:
Much has been written on the need for re-examination of the
rule approved in the Robicheaux case. See Wigmore in 17 Illinois
Law Review 458; 27 Columbia Law Review 754; Gendel in 19 Cali-
fornia Law Review 630; Prosser in 25 California Law Review 413;
Jackson in 17 Texas Law Review 399; Robinson in 27 Texas Law
Review 732. Thus far, however, but little has been achieved toward
inducing the courts to re-examine the rule. Wigmore has suggested
that the rule of joint and several liability in the field of torts had
its inception in the need of the law, bent on justice, to relieve a
plaintiff of the intolerable burden of proving what share each of
two or more wrongdoers contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, and
that the burden is just as intolerable and the need for relief there-
from is just as great when the independent tortious acts of multiple
defendants contribute to a plaintiff's indivisible injuries as when the
acts are done in concert and of common design. Jackson in 17 Illi-
nois Law Review 459.26
The most significant comments leading to the adoption of
the Restatement sections are those of Wigmore which have been
referred to above and which influenced the decision of the Texas
court. In commenting on Farley and other similar cases, Wigmore
said:
Such results are simply the law's callous dullness to innocent
sufferers. One would think that the obvious meanness of letting
wrongdoers go scot free in such cases would cause the courts to think
twice and to suspect some fallacy in their rule of law. It does not
take much reflection to see the reason of the original rule, i.e., mak-
ing each joint tortfeasor liable for the whole of the harm done, and
to perceive that the reason of that rule carries beyond the narrow
limits of its orthodox application. The rule should be: Wherever
25Id. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
26 Id. at 255, 248 S.W.2d at 733.
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two or more persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not,
cause a single general harm, not obviously assignable in parts to the
respective wrongdoers, the injured party may recover from each for
the whole. In short, wherever there is any doubt at all as to how
much each caused, take the burden of proof off the innocent suf-
ferer; make any one of them pay him for the whole, and then let
them do their own figuring among themselves as to what is the
share of blame for each.2
Wigmore made this final observation: 'This all goes to show
that a rule of law applied without regard to its reason may become
a rule of injustice.'"'2
In view of Wigmore's recommendation that in cases of doubt
as to how much injury each defendant caused, the emphasis should
be in the area of burden of proof - that the burden should be taken
off of the innocent sufferer - it would appear that Wigmore's argu-
ments were at long last vindicated by the adoption of section 433B
(2), the burden of proof approach.
One other case, illustrative of the minority or joint liability doc-
trine, is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee."9 This was an action
brought by certain farmers against four oil companies for damages
sustained from pollution. At the trial the defendants obtained a
verdict based on their theory that they could be held liable only if
the evidence established that a particular defendant had independent-
ly produced the plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs had asked the trial
judge to instruct the jury to render a verdict in their favor if it ap-
peared that the defendants had jointly produced the injuries com-
plained of. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying
the law of Louisiana, concluded that there was joint liability. It
remanded the case stating:
If, therefore, on a new trail, plaintiffs can adduce evidence suf-
ficient to show that the defendants, or any of them, were negil-
gent and, though acting separately, their negligence combined to
produce the pollution damage, plaintiffs may recover for the whole
damage against one or all of those contributing. The judgment is re-
versed and the cause is remanded for further and not inconsistent
proceedings.30
In the course of the opinion the court of appeals mentioned
the requirement that the conduct of each wrongdoer must appear
to have been a substantial factor in producing the harm to the plain-
tiff.
III. THE LAw IN COLORADO
Although the law in Colorado in pollution cases is somewhat
obscure, there has been a tendency at least toward the rule of joint
2 Wigmore, supra note 1, at 459.
2
8Id. at 460.
2189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951).
3 0 Id. at 212.
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liability. In Larimer & Weld Irr. Co. v. Walker,3 a flooding case,
joint liability was recognized. Two water companies, each with
knowledge of the other's act, conveyed water down a natural stream
(dry creek) on the same day. The volume was such that it raised
the stream of the channel above its capacity, resulting in an overflow
which damaged plaintiff's property. The court noted that the testi-
mony established that the defendant companies were operating to-
gether, and thus the acts of the one were in effect the acts of the
other. On the matter of joint liability it was said:
A further contention is that the evidence fails to establish a
joint tort. In order to render parties jointly liable for tort it must
clearly appear that the wrong complained of flowed from their joint
action or non-action. Mead v. Zang Brewing Co., 43 Colo. 1, 95
Pac. 284. To make them jointly liable the injury must be the result
of concerted action. Stratton's Independence v. Sterrett, 51 Colo.
26, 117 Pac. 351. In 36 Cyc. 483, the principle is thus stated:
'Where different persons owe the same duty and their acts naturally
tend to the same breach of their duty, the wrong may be regarded
as joint and both may be held liable.'
In this case the injury complained of was plainly the result of
the joint acts of the defendants in attempting to convey an exces-
sive amount of water through Dry Creek. The commingling of their
respective allowances of water in the stream produced the injury,
and under the rule announced they are each liable for the damage
done, and are therefore jointly liable. The case was tried upon a
correct theory and the instructions given properly stated the law
governing the issues involved.32
The emphasis is on actual concert of action as between these
defendants. Hence Colorado cannot be classified as a joint liability
jurisdiction.
Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, Inc. " is a pollution case which de-
clares that defendants operating independently, each contributing to
the pollution of the stream, are responsible individually for the en-
tire damage. The court said that one introducing extraneous matter
into a stream is under a duty to prevent damage as the result thereof
either from his act alone or his act in conjunction with acts of others.
This, however, was an injunction suit; the courts in this type of case
have been less restrictive about the cause factor.
One other interesting Colorado case is that of Reyher v. Mayne.34
Here two defendants were engaged in hunting. One of them shot
the plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment against both the
shooter and his companion. The Colorado Supreme Court held that
this judgment was not in error, in that the defendants were acting in
31 65 Colo. 320, 176 Pac. 282 (1918).
32 Id. at 323, 176 Pac. at 283-84.
3396 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934).
3490 Colo. 586, 10 P.2d 1109 (1932).
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concert. Both were violating the law in that they were trespassers.
The court described the action of the two defendants as "a thing in-
tegral and indivisible. Each defendant here is properly answerable
for the sum or aggregate of the damage inflicted 'by both wrong-
doers." "5
The decision in Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz,36 contains
some consolation as well as some argument material for those advo-
cating the individual liability principle. In that case the Colorado
Supreme Court held -that there was an improper joinder of parties
inasmuch as the several sources of the flooding were independent.
It made the following comments:
The difficulty that the plaintiff must necessarily encounter, if
he brings a separate action against either defendant, in showing
what its contribution was to the single injury, is no reason why this
court in a joint action against them, where the evidence does not
show a joint liability, should hold either defendant liable for the
entire injury to which he is only one separate contributor, nor is it
any reason why we should permit a joint action to be maintained
against both when there was no concurrence, either in time or
place, of their distinct and separate acts." 7
Joinder is, of course, no longer a problem but the substantive
questions remain. Perhaps the question is now an open one in
Colorado.
The reader might conclude from what has been said that sec-
tions 433A and B are plaintiff principles. It is suggested that they
strike a middle ground between the old rule of individual non-liabil-
ity and that of strict joint liability exemplified by Landers and Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. For example, it is open under the Restatement
view to the defendant to whom the burden of proof has shifted to
show nonliability by establishing that his part in the injury or dam-
age to the plaintiff was legally insubstantial or insignificant. It
should be borne in mind that this section does not, directly at least,
seek to change the substantive law; it is limited to a shifting of the
burden of proof and thus requires the defendants to prove their in-
nocence or to establish the extent of their respective contributions to
the indivisible result. This may prove in practice to be a difficult
burden. Again, however, it must be emphasized that in general these
are cases in which the defendants have acted independently and in
which the impact brought about by each defendant is presumably
susceptible to apportionment. The philosophy of section 433B(2) is
that there is a probability of fault inferable from the happening
similar to that in res ipsa loquitur cases. The several defendants are
35Id. at 590, 10 P.2d at 1110.
3677 Colo. 60, 234 Pac. 1059 (1925).
37 Id. at 69, 234 Pac. 1062.
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deemed to be in a superior position to produce evidence as to actual
contribution or participation.
One possible result of this rule is that in practice it could, with
the modern attitude toward expert witnesses, transform a wide variety
of cases which are now regarded as joint tortfeasor in character into
individual liability cases. Defendants could conceivably put this pro-
cedure to work for them.
One final observation: It should be kept in mind that the en-
tire concept of joint liability is and has been a fiction which has come
to us under the guise of concert of action. It was derived from in-
tentional tort cases. Obviously there is no true concert of action in a
case in which two automobiles coming from different directions neg-
ligently collide with the car of the plaintiffs. The culprits are held
jointly liable notwithstanding that they were not in a conspiracy. The
result is an expedient one; the plaintiff cannot prove the contribution
of each defendant and is relieved from the burden in the interests of
achieving a just result. We take this type of case for granted.
Sections 433A and B would open the door to a holding of joint
or several liability in the other multiple 'cause-indivisible injury cases,
thus extending what might be called a fiction on a consistent basis.
It eliminates the old, meaningless catch phrases such as concurrent
causes and recognizes that joint liability in all of the non-intentional
tort cases is not a matter of concert of action or joint enterprise but
is a question of whether damages can be feasibly and conveniently
apportioned. Experience has shown that the probabilities favor a
just result where joint liability is imposed. It thus appears hypocritical
to draw the line in the hard case and to rationalize the unjust result
by these catch phrase tests. Professor Wigmore must have had this in
mind when he said that "ignorance of history * * * does cruel wrong."
VOL. 43
